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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
-v-
MYRON A. HAMILTON, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 20646 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are as set 
forth previously in Appellant's Brief at 1-4. (See also 
Respondent's Brief at 1-7). The Appellant takes this opportunity to 
reply to the Respondent's Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
(Reply to Respondent's Point I) 
AN ADEQUATE RECORD HAS BEEN 
PROVIDED TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S 
CONTENTIONS AND TO ENABLE THIS 
COURT TO DECIDE THIS CASE. 
The record in this case is massive for a non-felony 
criminal case. However, despite earnest efforts, defense counsel's 
office was unable to locate the tapes of the circuit court trial in 
this case. (Appellant's Brief at 3 n. 1). These tapes were 
apparently the only portion of the extensive proceedings in both the 
circuit and district courts which was not provided to this Court. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In spite of this and the fact that the State was able to locate (and 
presumably listen to) the missing tapes, the State still complains < 
that the Appellant has supplied an inadequate record. (Respondent's 
Brief at 8-9 and 9, n.l). However, as will be demonstrated below, 
this complaint is invalid. i 
First, if an inadequacy of the record does exist, it 
affects only the trial stage of the proceedings which occurred in 
the circuit court. The complete record of the first appellate stage i 
of the proceedings, which occurred in the district court, is before 
this Court. Therefore, Mr. Hamilton's contention that he was denied 
assistance of appellate counsel in the district court is untarnished < 
by any inadequacy of the record claimed by the State. 
However, the Appellant contends that the record from the 
circuit court proceedings is adequate. To support this contention, 
one need look no further than the State's brief. That brief 
contains a detailed chronological description of the proceedings in 
this case which was gleaned from the available record. 
(Respondent's Brief at 3-7). Further, the State's brief cites with 
great specificity particular instances in the existent record which 
the State claims support its substantive allegations of propriety of 
the proceedings. (See, for example, Respondent's Brief at 11-21). 
Finally, the State concludes one of its points by declaring that 
"although defendant did not provide an adequate record of the entire 
court proceedings nor a transcript of the trial, it is, however, 
clear from the documents before this Court that . . . [the 
- 2 -
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proceedings below were proper.] (Respondent's Brief at 17). Indeed, 
the State's own substantive argument seems to undermine its claim 
that the record is inadequate. 
Further, as the record extant clearly shows, Mr. Hamilton 
was denied (and did not waive) assistance of counsel not only at 
trial but at critical pre-trial proceedings in the circuit court. 
(R.468, 469, 470-471, 484, 493, 514-516, January 11, 1984 
transcript). The right to assistance of counsel attaches to all 
critical stages of a criminal proceeding, not just to the actual 
trial. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), Coleman v. Alabama, 
399 U.S.I (1970). In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932), the 
United States Supreme Court stated that an accused "requires the 
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against 
him.n Clearly, the record establishes that Mr. Hamilton was 
deprived of the "guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him" in the circuit court. Even if the record 
is inadequate with respect to the trial itself, the record is 
adequate with respect to other proceedings in the circuit court. 
POINT II 
(Reply to Respondent's Points II, III, and IV) 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 











RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
In his opening brief, Appellant raised two issues, both of 
which concerned the denial of the right of assistance of counsel. 
" 3 ~ 
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The first issue concerned the denial of assistance of counsel at the 
trial level in the circuit court. (Appellantfs Brief at 6-11). In 
response to this contention, the State advances three claims: (1) 
that the Defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived 
his right to counsel (Respondent's Brief, Point II, at 9-17); (2) 
that the trial court properly found a waiver (Respondent's Brief, 
Point III, at 17-22)-, and (3) that the district court properly 
addressed the issue on appeal (Respondent's Brief, Point IV, at 
22-25). The facts of the case, as well as the case law, simply do 
not support the conclusions reached by the State. 
With respect to the issues concerning Mr. Hamilton's 
supposed waiver of his right to assistance of counsel, the State 
sites numerous instances in which it declares that Mr. Hamilton knew 
he was waiving his right to counsel in the circuit court. The State 
concludes that the "totality of circumstances" demonstrate such a 
waiver. (Respondent's Brief at 21-22). The simple fact remains, 
however, that the State can point to no instance in the record where 
the trial judge asked Mr. Hamilton if he was waiving his right to 
counsel. The State cannot even cite to an instance where the trial 
judge warned Mr. Hamilton that his continued handling of the case 
without either procuring or requesting counsel would be deemed a 
waiver of the right to counsel. The State cannot cite such 
instances because they did not occur. The State declares that the 
trial court "could only beg defendant to get counsel." 
(Respondent's Brief at 17). However, the State does not provide any 
citation to the record where such "begging" occurred. Indeed, the 
State is left to conclude that "Any lack of record of extensive 
- 4 -
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waiver questioning given the defendant's obvious intent and 
displeasure at being questioned, was certainly harmless error." 
(Respondent's Brief at 22). In fact, virtually no questioning 
occurred which directly concerned waiver. 
The State further complains that waiver should be inferred 
because of Mr. Hamilton's obstinance and bad faith. However, such 
obstinance cannot outweigh the responsibility that such a situation 
places on a trial judge. 
Several cases have discussed waiver of the right to 
counsel, and from these cases, it is possible to define the 
parameters of a constitutionally acceptable waiver. A finding of 
waiver is a requirement in right to counsel cases. The necessity of 
a finding that such a waiver has been made was decreed in Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Besides requiring that a waiver to 
right to counsel be "knowingly and intelligently" made, the Court in 
that case stated: , 
It has been pointed out that "courts indulge 
every reasonable presumption against waiver" of 
fundamental constitutional rights and that we "do 
not presume acquiscence in the loss of 
fundamental rights." . . . The constitutional 
right of an accused to be represented by counsel 
invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial 
court, in which the accused—whose life or 
liberty is at stake—is without counsel. This 
protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty 
; responsibility upon the trial judge of 
determining whether there is an intelligent and 
competent waiver by the accused. While an 
accused may waive the right to counsel, whether 
there is a proper waiver should be clearly 
determined by the trial court, and it would be 
fitting and appropriate for that determination to 
appear upon the record. Id. at 464, 465 
(emphasis added). 
- 5 -
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4 
In extending this protection to state criminal matters the Court in 
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) stated that the evidence | 
must show that the defendant was informed specifically of his right 
to the assistance of appointed or retained counsel and that he 
clearly rejected such assistance. No amount of circumstantial < 
evidence that the person may have been aware of his right to counsel 
and intended to relinquish it will suffice. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 471-2 (1966). , 
Further, an adequate waiver of right to counsel which 
results in an accused representing himself has additional 
requirements. In those cases, the defendant "should be made aware 
of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the 
record will establish that fhe knows what he is doing and his choice 
is made with eyes open.1" Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 
(1975). 
Finally, in Carnley v. Cochran, the Court stated: 
"Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record 
must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, 
that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and 
understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver." 
369 U.S. at 516. The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the position 
that waiver will not be presumed from a silent record when important 
constitutional rights are at stake. Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 at 
345 (Utah 1980) and State v. Cook, 26 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 at 22 
(1986). 
- 6 -
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With respect to the Statefs claim that the district court 
properly addressed the issue of denial of counsel at trial on 
appeal, the issue is tainted by the district court's failure to 
appoint counsel for Mr. Hamilton's appeal to that court. (See, 
Point III, infra). 
Appellant's opening brief contends that the issue of right 
to counsel was properly before the district court. (Appellant's 
Brief at 10-11). In any event, the district court did not address 
denial of the right to counsel in its decision. 
Finally, this Court need not even address the issue of 
denial of assistance of counsel at the trial level. As contended in 
Point III, below, and in Appellant's opening brief, Mr. Hamilton was 
unrepresented in his appeal to the district court. If this Court 
determines that this denial constituted error, remand to the 
district court for re-preparation and reconsideration of the 
original appeal (with the assistance of counsel) would be an 
appropriate remedy. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
FAILING TO APPOINT COUNSEL FOR 
MR. HAMILTON ON THE FIRST APPEAL. 
In his opening brief, Appellant argued that he was denied 
the assistance of counsel on his first appeal to the district court; 
furthermore, no waiver of the right to counsel was found by the 
district court. (Appellant's Brief at 11-14). The State does not 
respond to this issue in its brief. 
- 7 -
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The right of appeal is a constitutional right in the State 
of Utah. Article I, section 12 of the Constitution of Utah gives 
the accused the right to appeal in all cases. Utah Code Ann. 
§77-32-1 (1953/ as amended) guarantees the constitutional right of 
appeal for indigent defendants. Furthermore, the same provision 
guarantees the right to representation by an attorney in the 
prosecution of the first appeal of right. 
In Evitts v. Lucey/ 83 L.Ed.2d 821/ 827 (1985) the Supreme 
Court stated; 
Nonetheless, if a State has created appellate 
courts as "an integral part of the . . . system 
for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence 
of a defendant/" the procedures used in deciding 
appeals must comport with the demands of the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Constitution. (citations omitted). 
The Court stated that the Constitution demanded that the defendant 
be afforded the representation of counsel in pursuing an appeal. 
The Court delineated the reason for the necessity of the assistance 
of counsel during the appeal process: 
To prosecute the appeal/ a criminal appellant 
must face an adversary proceeding that-like a 
trial-is governed by intricate rules that to a 
layperson would be hopelessly forbidding. An 
unrepresented appellant-like an unrepresented 
defendant at trial - is unable to protect the 
vital interests at stake. J^ d. at 830. 
The right to assistance of appellate counsel may be 
waived. However/ as the Court of Appeals of New Mexico noted in 
State v. Lewis/ 719 P.2d 445 (N.M. App. 1986)/ the criteria for 
determining waiver of appellate counsel are stringent. In Lewis, 
the court stated: 
8 
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Consideration of an appellant's request to act as 
his own counsel on appeal necessarily involves: 
(l)alerting defendant to the hazards of serving 
as his own attorney and the difficulties and 
complexities of the appellate process; and 
(2)instructing defendant that he will be bound to 
follow all applicable appellate rules, just as 
any other appellant represented by counsel. 
Id. at 448. After declaring that these admonitions must appear on 
the record, the court further declared that the record must reflect 
"whether defendant has knowingly, intelligently and competently 
elected to dispense with appellate counsel." _I_d. (citations 
omitted). Finally, the New Mexico court stated that in the absence 
of such an on-the-record waiver, the appellate court "will indulge 
every reasonable presumption against waiver . . . ." _Id. Indeed, 
the court held that the right to assistance of appellate counsel 
remains "until it is affirmatively shown in the record" that the 
right has been waived. Id. at 447. 
In the present case, Mr. Hamilton appealed his circuit 
court convictions to the district court (R.352-358). However, the 
entire appeal process apparently transpired solely on paper. The 
record reveals no personal appearance by either party before the 
district court. Furthermore, the record reveals no instance in 
which Mr. Hamilton was questioned concerning his ability to afford 
an attorney for the appeal process or admonished about the hazards 
of bringing his own appeal. The record is silent with respect to a 
waiver of right to assistance of appellate counsel. Mr. Hamilton 
was never informed of the availability of appointed counsel and 
proceeded through the appellate process without assistance of 
counsel. These facts are unchallenged by the State. Also 
unchallenged by the State is Appellant's contention that failure to 
" 9 " Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
provide an attorney on appeal (or, at least, attain a waiver of the 
right to representation) deprived him of a fair review of his i 
circuit court conviction. 
CONCLUSION < 
For the foregoing reasons, the appellant, Myron Hamilton, 
seeks reversal of his convictions and remand of his case to the 
circuit court with an order for a new trial with the assistance of < 
counsel. In the alternative, the appellant seeks reversal of the 
district court decision on his appeal of right and remand of his 
case to the district court with an order permitting a new appeal at
 { 
the district court level with the assistance of counsel, 
•At 
Respectfully submitted this day of August, 1986. 
L.UAJCC4, C • 7u^4J2s£ 
CURTIS C. NESSET 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CURTIS C. NESSET, hereby certify that four copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Brief will be delivered to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this ,?^day of August, 1986. 
(^UJt^tiJ^ C • 
CURTIS C. NESSET 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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DELIVERED by _ _ this day of 
August, 1986. 
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